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THE RIGHT OF A TESTATOR TO PAUPERIZE
HIS HELPLESS DEPENDENTS
HERBERT D. LAUBE*
A parent is under a moral duty to provide for the support and
maintenance of his children during the period of their dependence.
Does the law permit a parent, at death, to cut off his helpless de-
pendents from the sole source of their support and make them the
objects of charity? This problem involves a conflict between the le-
gal right of the parent to dispose of his property by will and the
legal duty of the parent to maintain his dependent children and
prevent them from becoming public charges. This conflict involves
two questions:
I. Has a testator the right to disinherit his helpless children?
II. Is the estate of the testator liable for the support of his help-
less dependents?
The answers to these two questions afford a solution of the problem.
I. HAS A TESTATOR THE RIGHT TO DISINHERIT His
HELPLESS DEPENDENTS?
In I9o6, Mr. Justice Lamm said:
"That a testator has the naked legal right to disinherit, say
an infant of tender years left at his death a motherless orphan,
is so. That is to say, such result necessarily flows from the
plenary testamentary power existing in this State under our
statutes, and at common law.... By the same token, a father
has the naked legal right to disinherit..., a feebleminded
daughter of no earning capacity and leave her, like a falling
autumn leaf, the sport of every ill wind that blows. But these
general principles must be taken with some grains of salt. They
are hard sayings (stumbling blocks), much murmured against."'
The purpose of this inquiry is to ascertain the basis and the present
validity of these stumbling blocks. A decade ago, the unlimited
freedom of testamentary disposition of property, regardless of the
claims of family, was denounced 2 as so contrary "to common sense,
justice and humanity" that its existence could be reasonably attrib-
uted only to inertia. In England, it was said, a man, however
wealthy he may be, may leave his family destitute and devise and
bequeath his whole estate to a home for lost dogs. In 1877, The
Spectator declared3
*Assistant Professor, Cornell Law School.
'Meier v. Buchter, 197 Mo. 68, 86, 94 S. W. 883 (19o6).
2Lefroy, Flaws in tze Common Law (1918) 51 CHI. LEG. N. 63, (1918) 54
CAN. L. J. 31, (1918) 4VA. LAW REG. (N. s.) 153.
IThe Hall Will Case (1877) 11 IR. L. T. 3.
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"It is very difficult to make ani average EngisiiatL listen to a
word against the liberty of bequest, He holds that such a word
impugns his right to do what he likes with his own property, that
it threatens his authority over his family.... and that it is put
forward, in some mysterious way or other, in the interests of
French democratic opinion....
"Englishmen 'make eldest sons' every day, and leave not only
nieces, but younger sons, sisters and mothers dependent upon the
charity of the eldest."
In this discussion, slight reference will be made to English ex-
perience. The English problem is peculiar because of the importance
of settlements4 which provide for the children of the marriage.
Moreover, the fact that, until 1926, primogeniture was the rule of
intestacy' controlling real property in England makes the English
law inapplicable to the United States. Sir Henry Maine said that the
European preference for primogeniture was due, not to the desire to
disinherit the bulk of the children in favor of one, but rather to the
strength and durability which it gave to kingly authority in the social
organization.6 Justice yielded to political expediency because it was
necessary for the fief to descend as an integral whole.'
The English law of succession underwent considerable modifi-
cation in America. The rule of primogeniture was abolished in all
the colonies." The legislatures of the various states established fitter
schemes of descent and distribution based upon a doctrine of equal-
ity.9 But, said The Spectator, outside of England, no such absolute
testamentary power exists except in the United States.10
THE RIGHT TO WILL
In 1857, the Indiana court declared that the right to dispose of
property by will is now coming to be regarded as a natural right,
though Blackstone and Paley do not admit it.' As late as 189i, a
4Inalienable Family Rights in Property (1926) 6o IR. L. T. 1O5, iO6; EVERSLEY,
DOMESTIC RELATIONS (4th ed. 1926) 86-146; BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
(Cooley's 4th ed. 1899) 450.
5EVERSLEY, supra note 4, P. 569.
6ANCIENT LAW (3d ed. 1878) p. 229.
72 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed., 1899) 262.
8McMurray, Liberty of Testation and Some Modern Limitations Thereon (1919)
14 ILL. L. REv.,96, I17.
9Schouler, Origin and Policy of Wills (1886) 2o AM. L. REV. 502, 508.
'
0Supra note 3, P. 3. "This liberty is so wide that even the ratepayer, who dur-
ing a man's life is protected from the burden of supporting his wife and young
family by the Vagrancy Act, may have to provide for his widow and children if he
chooses to leave his fortune to others." Inalienable Family Rights in Property,
supra note 4, P. 105.
"Noel v. Ewing, 9 Ind. 37, 61 (1857).
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New Jersey court rested the right upon the previously exploded
theory of social compact.12 Recefntly, out in the progressive West, it
was discovered that "It is an attribute of property that the owner
thereof has the right to dispose of it as he pleases. " 13 When the North
Carolina court was seeking for light as to the charadter of the testa-
mentary right, it discovered that only in Wisconsin was it a natural
right.14 In i9o6, when Mr. Justice Winslow declared the right to be
inherent, 5 Dean Pound observed that his pronouncement was in
direct opposition to the steady progress of the law.8 The concurring
opinion in the Wisconsin case, by Mr. Justice Marshall,'17 embodies a
philosophy of absolute rights that had been generally rejected in
19o6 except in restricted areas of the earth. 8 Yet, nearly ten years
later, the same judge declared that "As often, and not too often,
said, the testamentary right is one of the most important of the in-
herent incidents of human existence."' 9
12
"The right of dominion over property is not a natural one. It is a product of
social compact, bestowed as a reward for the virtues or superiorities by which the
property was produced or acquired. When man dies, the property which he has
accumulated must remain behind him. He possesses no natural right to transmit
it to persons of his selection. Under natural law, at his death, it would go to the
strong, and those to whom he would give it might never take. Here again the
social compact pledges itself to enforce his disposition of it.... His power of
disposition is absolute. Possessing capacity he may give to whom he pleases."
Smith v. Smith, 48 N. J. Eq. 566, 590 (1893).
131n re Moore's Estate, 114 Or. 444, 447, 236 Pac. 265,266 (1925).
4Peace v. Edwards, 17o N. C. 64, 65, 86 S. E. 807 (1915). The court said that
the right to dispose of property by will is not a natural right. The only case hold-
ing to the contrary to be found is Nunnemacher v. State, 129 Wis. 190, 1o8 N. W.
627 (19o6). A note in (igo8) 9 Ann. Cas. 726 says:
"The doctrine of the reported case (Nunnemacher v. State) that there is a
natural right, protected by the constitution, to take property by inheritance,
devise, or bequest, is entirely new to the law. The doctrine which has long been
regarded as not open to question is that such right is entirely dependent upon, and
subject to modification or abridgment by, statutory law."
15Nunnemacher v. State, supra note 14, p. 202.
'
8Pound, Need of Sociological Jurisprdence (1907) 19 GREEN BAG 607, 613.
17Marshall, J., supra note I5, p. 224.
lsRITCHI, NATURAL RIGHTS (1894) Preface.
"When I began, some three years ago, to write a paper on 'Natural Rights,'...
I had a certain fear that in criticizing that famous theory I might be occupied in
slaying the already slain."
19Ball v. Boston, 153 Wis. 27, 31, 141 N. W. 8 (1913).
Vinogradoff has said, "Attempts... to give the theory of the law of nature a
direct bearing on the practice of the Courts have not been successful.. ." Com-
MON SENSE IN LAW 239.
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It may be true that the testator is a despot within limits. But,
as Mr. Justice Holmes has reminded us:
"All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical
extreme. Yet all in fact are limited by the neighborhood of
principles of policy which are other than those on which the
particular right is founded, and which become strong enough to
hold their own when a certain point is reached." 0
The particular application of this philosophy to the problem, which
forms the thesis of this discussion, was made by Redfield a generation
before the opinions in the Wisconsin case were rendered. He said:
"The right of testamentary disposition of property is, un-
questionably, one of the results of cultivated social life, and
dependent upon municipal law. But it is, nevertheless, an in-
stinctive sentiment, intimately associated with that love of
acquisition, and dominion, which forms the basis of social
progress; and which in its normal development, is the sure
measure of advancing civilization, and, in its morbid excesses,
equally marks the process of declension, and the increase of
crime.1 21
The munnurings of society against the disinheritance of helpless
dependents is not due to the normal exercise of testamentary power.
They have been directed against morbid excesses of the testator's
dominion, which courts, ill-advisedly, have thought to be absolute.
Those morbid excesses are the basis of this study.
Let us examine some of the decisions to disclose the verbal violence
in which courts indulge in proclaiming the absolutism of the testator's
power of disposition. In a California case," the jury was told that
"one has the right to make an unjust will, an unreasonable will, or
even a cruel will." The will was denied probate and the judgment
was affirmed. In a Pennsylvania case," the court said that a testator
can distribute his property as he sees fit, without regard to the pre-
judices which influence him. In this case, the nearest relatives were
first cousins. In Missouri, the Supreme Court declared that "The
absolute ownership of property implies the right of arbitrary dis-
position of it according to loves, hates or caprices of the grantor."'2
The grantor had given all his property to his second wife and the only
child by her to the exclusion of his children by the first wife, the
youngest of whom was over 35 years of age. The court reversed
2°Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U. S. 349, 355, 28 Sup. Ct. 529
(1907).
"2REDFIELD, WILLS (4th ed., 1876) § I.
21n re Willitts' Estate, 175 Calif. 173, I86, I65 Pac. 537, 543 (I917). See also,
Estate of Packer, 164 Calif. 525, 129 Pac. 778 (I913).
231n re Phillips Estate, 244 Pa. 35, 9o AtI. 457 (1914).
"4Hayes v. Hayes, 242 Mo. 155, 169, 145 S. W. 1155 (I9II).
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the verdict of the jury against the will. In Michigan, it was de-
clared that "Nothing can prevent him (owner) from making either a
will or deed as eccentric, as injudicious or as unjust as caprice, friv-
olity, revenge can dictate."2 Here the court seems to have ex-
hausted its vocabulary of superlatives. How passionately harsh is
the language! It is merely evidence, not of the law, but of injudicious,
judicial utterance. The contestant in the case was a biother, whom
the deceased had not seen in 40 years. In an Oregon case,2" it was
held that a testatrix could do as she pleased with her property.
The testatrix was unmarried and had no lineal descendants. Ex-
travagance in judicial expression.is apt to be very intense when the
testator has disinherited a daughter who has exasperated her father
by not deferring to his wishes in the selection of a husband. In
such cases, California,'2 7 Kansas2 8 and Texas 9 cry out that the right
of absolute dominion is sacred and inviolable. The law of the land
authorizes parents to disinherit their sons and daughters for any-
cause and without cause. A careful examination of the cases seems to
reveal that generally where the language of the court is unrestrained,
the testamentary disposition was reasonable ° or the verdict of the
jury made the judicial effusion superfluous. Most of these courts
might well be admonished to heed the words of John Marshall3 and
construe the law in the light of the facts of the case under decision.
If they obeyed the admonition, these cases would contain less mis-
leading effervescence.
If one wishes to learn that the right to will is neither fundamental32
nor natural, one needs only to read what the courts have said as to
the statutory regulation of the right. In contrast to the language
just referred to, in these cases, the courts seem to use a different
vocabulary. Perhaps the words of Mr. Justice De Graff are as
luminous as any which may be cited. In speaking of the power of
the legislature, he said:
"Schneider v. Vosbugh, 143 Mich. 476, 478, iO6 N. W. 1129 (igo6).
211n re Darst's Will, 34 Or. 58, 54 Pac. 947 (1898).
27In re Kaufman, 117 Calif. 288, 295, 49 Pac. 192 (1897).
28Dreisback v. Spring, 93 Kan. 240, r44 Pac. 195 (i914).
29Linney v. Peloquin, 35 Tex. 29, 39 (1871-72).
30The court said in In re Young's Estate, go N. J. Eq. 236, 242, io6 Atl. 425,428
(1918), that "no court has the power to refuse probate to a will merely because
the disposition the testator has made of her property by it appears to the court to
be unnatural, unreasonable and unjust." In this case, Madam Nordica cut off her
husband, the contestant, with only the unpleasant reminder thatshe had already
advanced him $4oo,ooo.
3'Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 399, 5 L. Ed. 257 (U. S. 1821).
32In re Emerson's Will, 183 Wis. 437, 445, 198 N. W. 441, 443 (1924).
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"The right to take property by devise or descent is a statutory
privilege, and not a natural right. Such matters are strictly
within legislative control.... The Legislature may restrict
the succession of estates of decedents in any manner, and, if it
pleased, could absolutely repeal the statute of wills and of
descent and distribution. It could in the exercise of sovereignty
take any or all property upon the death of the owner for the
payment of the decedent's debts, and apply the residue to public
u-s~s. 
"33
The tenor of all the recent decisions4 on the validity of inheritance
taxes, excepting those in Wisconsin, is the same. In the light of such
a pronouncement, it becomes difficult to understand why Mr. Justice
Lamm believed that a testator had a right to pauperize his helpless
dependents.
THE UNNATURAL WILL
Courts frequently characterize a will as 'natural' or 'unnatural'.
They are words of uncertain import. Their ambiguity has served
only to becloud the judicial process. In 1922, the Missouri court said
in McNealey v. Murdock:
"While it is the right of every person in this state to make
testamentary disposition of his or her property to whomsoever
they will, and to disinherit any or all their natural heirs if it
pleases them to do so, this right does not abrogate nor destroy
the natural affection of a mother for her children. It is a law of
nature which we cannot repeal, and which is therefore like the
law of gravitation, an evidential fact in every issue involving its
operation.... The statutory heir is often far removed in
consanguinity... so that there would be no evidential force in
the relationship.""
The ties of blood are not usually disregarded.3 Whenever they are,
the act is deemed unnatural. The law recognizes that a man's chil-
dren and their descendants are the natural objects of his bounty.37 In
North Carolina, it was contended that there was no such thing as an
unnatural will known to the law. Although the court did not fully
approve the instruction which defined an unnatural will, it refused to
33I n re Emerson's Estate, I9I Iowa 900, 905, 183 N. W. 327,329 (1921).
mState v. Guinotte, 275 Mo. 298, 204 S. W. 8o6 (1918); I-n reRogers' Estate, 250
S. W. 576 (Mo. 1923); State v. Walker, 226 Pac. 894 (Mont. 1924); Rhode Island
Hospital & Trust Co. v. Doughton, 187 N. C. 263, 121 S. E. 741 (1924); Moody v.
Hagan, 36 N. D. 471, 162 N. W. 704 (1917); In re Inman's Estate, ioi Or. 182, 199
Pac. 615 (1921); Cornett's Executors v. Commonwealth, 127 Va. 640, io5 S. E. 230
(1920); Sherwood's Estate, 122 Wash. 648, 211 Pac. 734 (1922).
3-293 Mo. 16, 26, 239 S. W. 126, 129 (1922).
16In re Monroe's Will, 2 Con. Surr. 395, 20 N. Y. Supp. 82, 84 (1889).
37Bradley v. Onstatt, 18o Ind. 687, 694, 103 N. E. 798 (1914).
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reverse because of it.38 It is clear from an examination of these cases
that a will which, in its disposition of property to lineal descendants,
tends to conform to the provisions of the statute of descent and
distribution is natural.39
But, it is said, there is nothing "unnatural nor surprising" about a
will of a childless widow who disinherited her sister whom she had not
seen for 6o years in favor of her husband's nephew and strangers who
had cared for her in illness.40 It is not unnatural for a man to prefer
his wife to his brothers and sisters.4' If a bachelor uncle fails to make
provision for his nieces and nephews, his will "is not at variance with
natural instincts," because he is under no obligation to provide for
them. 2 The will of a childless widower is not unnatural because it
disregards poor and needy relatives.A But a will which bestows
property on the wealthy and overlooks the poor in the same relation is
not natural. It suggests a disordered mind." A will which disinherits
a son and daughter who are comfortably provided for and bestows all
the property on the grandsons is "not a strange and unnatural
thing."45 It is unnatural for a woman, without cause, to fail to pro-
vide for an adult daughter for whom she entertained the greatest
affection.46 It is natural for a father to prefer the kind and attentive
child to the thankless and ungrateful one.4 7 It is natural for him to
favor the children who are nearest to him in respect and affection or
by reason of intimate social or domestic relations. 48 A will is not
38In re Hardee's Will, 187 N. C. 381, 382, 121 S. E. 667, 668 (1924). See also,
McGinnis v. Dempsey, 27 Mich. 362, 376 (1873).
391n re Allen's Estate, 230 Mich. 584, 595, 2o3 N. W. 479 (1925).4OPetterson v. Imbsen, 46 S. D. 540, 545, 194 N. W. 842, 844 (923).
"It is common knowledge that the blood tie between brother and sister is not
as binding as that between parent and child, or the tie between husband and
wife.. ." Burham v. Grant, 24 Colo. App. 131, 137, 334 Pac. 254 (1913). See
also, Beyer v. Schlenker, i8x S. W. 69, 72 (Mo. I935).
UIn re Lyddy's Will, I7 St. Rep. 2,4 N. Y. Supp. 468,471 (I888), aff'd 24 St.
Rep. 607, 5 N. Y. Supp. 636, 637 (1889); Matter of Fricke, 47 St. Rep. io, 19
N. Y. Stipp. 335 (3892).
4In re McDevitt, 95 Calif. 17, 31, 30 Pac. IO (3892).
"It was for the testator to select the objects of his bounty.... What nephews or
nieces, if any, should enjoy that bounty was for his determination, not for courts
or juries." In re Marx's Estate, 201 Mich. 504, 508, 367 N. W. 976 (I938).
See also, Stevens v. Leonard, 154 Ind. 67, 70, 56 N. E. 27 (1900).43Gathings v. Howard, 122 Miss. 355, 383, 84 So. 240, 246 (3920). See also,
Farr v. Thompson, Cheves 37, 48 (S. C. 3839).
44Manatt v. Scott, I06 Iowa, 203, 217, 76 N. W. 717 (3898).
41n re Fay's Estate, 197 Mich. 675, 685, 364 N. W. 523 (1917).
4 6
-n re Gallo's Estate, 6I Calif. App. 363, 168, 214 Pac. 496, 499 (3923).
47Nicholas v. Kershner, 20 W. Va. 251, 258 (3882).
48In re Hess's Will, 48 Minn. 504, 5i N. W. 614 (1892).
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unnatural if a mother disinherits an adult daughter, who incurred her
hostility by siding with her father.49 Where the testator had an
antipathy for his son's wife, the disinheritance of her children was not
unusual. ° It is not unnatural for a father to disinherit an abusive son
of 4o;51 but it would be "an unnatural and heartless act" for a testator
to disinherit a child whom he adopted when she was I4 months old in
favor of his brother. 2 The important circumstance is, were those who
would naturally be expected to be the objects of bounty provided
for.5 In these cases, the standard set up by the statute of descent
and distribution is disregarded because the relation is too remote
from the standpoint of dependence or affection, or both, or is over-
come by countervailing factors. The question seems to have been:
Was the departure warranted under the circumstances? If it was, it
was a natural will. Clearly this is a question of fact which is con-
stantly being discussed as a question of law.
If the objective test of naturalness is applied, then, according to a
New York case,5 "The question is not, however, whether the gifts are
such as, upon a whole, we would have advised under the same cir-
cumstances, but whether there is such a violent departure from what
we would consider natural, that they cannot fairly be referred to any
cause other than a disordered intellect." This is a matter for the jury
to determine. The standard which the statute of descent and distri-
bution sets up as to lineal descendants is a standard of reasonableness
for disposition of property. But considerations in particular cases
may make other dispositions reasonable. If all the children and their
descendants are disinherited, the statutory standard of reasonable-
ness seems to be material. If collateral heirs are disregarded, it is
relatively immaterial. Cousins to the second, third and fourth degree
of propinquity are not included in the definition of "natural objects of
testator's bounty.51 5 If one child is preferred to another, then the
question of justification enters. It may be a matter of affection or
49In re Journeay's Will, i App. Div. 567, 44 N. Y. Supp. 548 (2d Dept. 1897),
aff'd 162 N.Y. 611 and 646, 57 N. E. 1113 (1900). Under the same facts, it has
been held that if one "pleases to dispose of it [property] contrary to the dictates of
natural or moral obligation, he has a perfect right to do so." Hoerth v. Zable, 92
Ky. 202, 206, 17 S. W. 360 (189I).
60In re Sturtevant's Will, 9 Or. 269, 296, 178 Pac. 192, 201 (1919).
51Haight v. Haight, 112 N. Y. Supp. 144, 146 (19o8).
5Shields v. Ingram, 5 Redf. Surr. 346, 348 (N. Y. 1882).
12 BL. CoMm., supra note 4, at 509, n. 4.
54Peck v. Cary, 27 N. Y. 9, I8 (1863).
5In re Campbell's Will, 136 N. Y. Supp. io86, 1097 (1912).
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animosity, kindness or ingratitude, wealth or poverty. The natural-
ness of the will is a question of fact. As the Alabama court said:
"A will is not necessarily unnatural because of a discrimina-
tion between heirs of the same degree, or because of the entire
exclusion of part or all of them. The circumstances of the case
determine the naturalness of a donation or bequest. It cannot
be said, as a matter of law, that the affection for one, though not
of kin, raised from infancy by the donor, is unnatural, or that a
gift or bequest to such a person is unnatural. It is a question of
fact for the jury. 5
And, as such, it clearly turns upon the question of whether under the
circunstances it was reasonable. In the opinion of the Iowa court
the unnaturalness of a will "is not to be deemed self-evident on the
face . . . (of the will) as a matter of mathematics. On this question
the history of the family is to be considered, and the moral equities
and obligations appearing therefrom. '57
But, in determining the naturalness of a will, some courts have
applied the subjective test. The test of a man's ability to dispose of
his property is made to depend upon his conception of his obligations
to those who are the objects of his bounty.58 The will is natural if it
conforms to the nature and disposition of the person who makes it. 59
A dissolute fellow, who passes over his paternal uncle and maternal
aunt and gives his patrimony to his illegimate children and their
mother, is merely making a will which is in precise accordance with
the tenor of his abnormal life. It accords with his natural obliga-
tions. If the will was unjust, that was the natural character of the
man.
61
At any rate, when an unnatural distribution of property is made,
the courts scrutinize closely the circumstances under which it is
made. 2 Indeed, if the natural objects of bounty are excluded, the
will is viewed with great suspicion.0 It requires, in Georgia," but
MHenry v. Hall, IO6 Ala. 84, 17 So. 187 (1894).
671n re Fousek's Estate, I88 Iowa 700, 702, 175 N. W. 29, 30 (I919). See Haines,
Law of Nature in State and Federal Decisions (1925) 25 YALE L. J. 617, 652.
58Lavin v. Thomas, 123 App. Div. 113, IO8 N. Y. Supp. 112, 114 (4 th Dept.
19o3); Drewry v. Armstrong, 223 S. W. 281, 285 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
591n re Holman's Estate, 42 Or. 345, 358, 70 Pac. 908 (19o2).
60In re Klinzer, 71 Misc. 620, 13o N. Y. Supp. 1059, 1072, 8 Mills 112, 133
(19n1).
6'Matter of Ruef, i8o App. Div. 203,207, 167 N. Y. Supp. 498 (4th Dept. 1917).
62Singer v. Taylor, 90 Kan. 285, 288, 133 Pac. 841, 842 (1913).
"Marx v. McGlynn, 88 N. Y. 357, 371 (1882); Matter of Burke, 86 Misc. II,
153, 149 N. Y. Supp. 142 (I914); Degenhardt v. Joplin, 239 S. W. 692 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1922); REDFELD, Op. cit. supra. note 21, p. 12.
"Slaughter v. Heath, 127 Ga. 747, 756, 57 S. E. 69 (I9O6); Franklin v. Belt, 130
Ga. 37,40, 6oS. E. 146 (I907). See supra note 6I, p. 2o6 .
568 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
slight evidence to show such a will is the result of an aterration of
intellect. The law adopts the "very rational and common sense
principle" that for a man to bequeath his property to the exclusion of
wife and children is so unnatural an act, as human experience shows,
to require very little more evidence to establish that he is not of
sound and disposing mind.5 New York has said that a will may,
under all the circumstances, be unnatural in its dispositions, so that
its provisions would be evidence of mental defect, obliquity or
perversion of mind which would require explanation." In Missouri
and Vermont, an unnatural will casts the burden onthe proponent
to show that the testator was a perfectly free agent.67 But a will can-
not beset aside on the mere ground that it is unnatural. Of course, to
assume that an unnatural will is ever an isolated transaction is to
assume what is generally contrary to human experience. But where
"it does violence to the natural instincts of the heart, to the dictates
of fatherly affection, to natural justice, to solemn promises, to moral
duty, such unexplained inequality and unreasonableness is entitled
to great influence in considering the question of testamentary capac-
ity and undue influence.1 6s An unnatural disposition is evidence
tending to throw light on testamentary capacity. 9 The weight of
65Wetter v. Habersham, 60 Ga. 193, 197 (1878). The Georgia Code so pro-
vides. Ga. Ann. Code (Park, 1914), §3832.
661n re Budlong, 126 N. Y. 423, 432, 27 N. E. 945 (189i). See also Seaman v.
Husband, 256 Pa. 571, 575, IOO Atl. 941 (1917).
67Weston v. Hanson,212 Mo. 248, 270, 11 S. W. 44 (19o8); McFadin v. Catron,
120 Mo. 252, 272, 25 S. W. 506 (1893); Gay v. Gillilan, 92 Mo. 250, 5 S. W. 7
(1887); In re Barney's Will, 70 Vt. 352,370, 40 Atl. 1027 (1898); 40 Cyc. I154.
"A natural presumption in the case was, that the donor would give the bulk of
her property to her needy relatives rather than a stranger." Here the physician,
who attended the testatrix, was beneficiary. Woodbury v. Woodbury, 141 Mass.
329, 334, 5. N. E. 275 (1886).
Contra: Dobie v. Armstrong, 16o N. Y. 584, 593, 55 N. E. 302 (1899); Wood v.
Bishop, i Dem. Surr. 512, 518 (N. Y. 1883); Pritchard v. Hutton, 187 Mich. 346,
36o, 153 N. W. 705 (1915); Simon v. Middleton, 5i Tex. App. 531, 538, 112 S. W.
441 (19o8).
68Newman v. Smith, 77 Fla. 633, 77 Fla. 667, 685, 82 So. 236, 251 (X919).
"A father may disinherit his children and the children may not be heard to say
that his act in doing so is contrary to natural justice; except in case a child be so
helpless because of tender age or mental or physical infirmity that no father,
except his mind be perverted, would so far forget parental affection or lose sight of
duty, saying nothing about pity, as to send his estate entirely away from such an
one. In such case the law still permits the consideration of natural justice."
In re Allen's Estate, supra note 39, p. 595.
691n re Martin's Estate, 170 Calif., 657, 663, ii Pac. 138, 141 (1915); In re
Johnson's Estate, 72 Calif. App. 663, 670, 237 Pac. 816, 8i9 (1925); Lehman v.
Lindemayer, 48 Colo. 305, 313, 1o9 Pac. 956 (191o); Holland v. Bell, 148 Ga. 277,
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evidence depends upon how far the provisions depart from what is
natural.7 0
TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY
In 1865, Chief Justice Denio admonished courts to be careful not to
confound perverse opinions and unreasonable prejudices with mental
alienation.7' Perverse conduct does not amount to insanity. It may
be wickedness pure and simple.72 Unjust and absurd as the provisions
of the will of a relentless, jealous testator may be, they are not
necessarily the pure creations of a perverted imagination, without
any foundation in reality.7 3 Wills do not depend for their validity
upon the justice of the testator's prejudice.74 Prejudice against a
child invalidates a will only when it is an insane delusion.7 5 It may be
evidence of mental derangement.76 To be monomania it must be
utterly groundless and irrational.7 7 But, in Oregon, if the aversion,
spite or prejudice resolves itself into mental perversion, the will is
invalid.78
A few cases speak of moral insanity. It is a perversion of the senti-
ments and affections, manifesting itself in jealousy, anger, hate, or
resentment.79 However violent or unnatural, it will not defeat a
will unless in fact the emanation of a delusion.8 0  Redfield says
that the English courts have manifested a reluctance to yield in
any sense to the recognition of any morbid affection as moral in-
279, 96 S. E. 419, 420 (i918); Hollenbeck v. Cook, I8O Ill. 65, 70, 54 N. E. 154
(1899); Bradley v. Onstatt, 18o Ind. 687, 694, 1O3 N. E. 798 (1914); Smith v.
James, 72 Iowa 515, 516, 34 N. W. 309 (1887); Gott v. Dennis, 296 Mo. 66, 86,246
S. W. 218, 223 (1922); In re Gunderman's Estate, 102 Neb. 590, 594, 168 N. W.
359, 361 (1918); In re King's Will, 172 N. Y. Supp. 869, 873 (1918); Reynolds v.
Root, 62 Barb. 250,252 (N.Y. 1862); In re Hinton's Will, i8o N. C. 206,212, IO4-
S. E. 341, 344 (1920); Frye v. Frye, 17 Ohio App. 246, 248 (1922); Campbell v.
Campbell, 215 S. W. 134, 137 (Tex. Civ. App. I919); In re Martin's Will, 92 Vt.
362, 371, 104 Atl. OO (1918); Elliott v. Fisk, 162 Wis. 249, 253, 155 N. W. iio
(1916); 40 Cyc. 116o.
70SuPra note 46, p. 175, 214 Pac. 501.
71Am. Seamen's Friend Soc. v. Hopper, 33 N. Y. 619, 624 (1865).
72Bohler v. Hicks, 12o Ga. 8oo, 804, 48 S. E. 3o6, 308 (1904).
73Potter v. Jones, 20 Or. 239, 249, 25 Pac. 769 (1891).
74(19o) 117 Am. St. Rep. 582 note.
75Huggins v. Drury, 192 Ill. 528, 536, 6I N. E. 652 (1901); Schmidt v. Schmidt
201 Ill. 191, 199, 66 N. E. 371 (1903).
76Sherley v. Sheley's Ex'r, 81 Ky. 240, 244 (1883).
77Pelamourges v. Clark, 9 Iowa I, 23 (1859).
78Hollman's Will, 42 Or. 345, 357, 70 Pac. 908 (19o2).
71Taylor v. McClintock, 87 Ark. 243, 112 S. W. 405 (1908).
°
80McClintock v. Curd, 32 Mo. 411, 421 (1862).
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sanity.81 But, in 1862, Mr. Justice Doe said, in a dissenting opinion:
"The verdict on the issue of sanity should be set aside, because
the court instructed the jury that delusion is the test of what is
called active insanity; that a moral insanity without delusion
does not incapacitate a person to make a will."' '
The common sense of this able judge, on this point, seems to have met
with no judicial approval. Yet, twenty years later, the Illinois
court, in sustaining the verdict of the jury against the will said:
"We find it difficult to believe that an egotism which is so
extravagant and distorted that it.... wholly disregards and
ignores the natural claims of a needy child, known to be worthy,
and dutiful, and loving, and the affections ordinarily implanted
in the heart for such a child, can consist with a mind entirely free
from disease causing morbid delusion.'"
To justify such a statement as a matter of fact would be difficult. The
testator left a widow and an only child, a daughter, who was married.
He left his daughter the income of $2,000 for life. Most of the balance
of his $ioo,ooo estate he left to further religious education. One
judge dissented vigorously, proclaiming
"The testator had his eccentricities of character, but taking
the whole evidence together, it shows most clearly, in my judg-
ment, that he had full testamentary capacity."
The test of testamentary capacity is generally conceded to include
the ability of the testator to comprehend what is the extent of his
property and who should be natural objects of his bounty.M How
shall the ability to comprehend the natural objects of one's bounty be
defined? Over a century ago, a New Jersey court declared, in approv-
ing an instruction to the jury, that
"a disposing mind and memory.is a mind and memory which have
the capacity of recollecting, discerning and feeling the relations,
connections and obligations of family and blood. And these
definitions I take to be accurately true."
In i9o8, this notion was repudiated in Arkansas. As a champion of
testatorial absolutism, the court declared:
"The test relates, not to the moral quality of the act done, but
to the mental capacity of the testator to do what he did. The
81
REDFIELD, Supra note 21, p. 77.
s2Boardman v. Woodman, 47 N. H. 120, x46 (1867).
$American Bible Society v. Price, 115 Ill. 623, 641, 5 N. E. 126 (1886).
14(1889) 3 L. R. A. (x. s.) 172, note; Cordrey v. Cordrey, i Houst. 269, 273
(Del. 1856); Hanrahan v. O'Toole, 139 Iowa 229, 233, 117 N.'W. 675 (1908);
Horn V. Pullman, 72 N. Y. 269, 276 (1878); Chrisman v. Chrisman, 16 Or. 127,
137, 18 Pac. 6 (1888); Harrison v. Rowan, 3 Wash. C. C. 58o, 586 (189).85Den v. Johnson, 5 N. J. L. (2 Southard) 454, 458, 8 Am. Dec. 61o, 613 (189).
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question is, not whether the testator did actually appreciate the
deserts of and the relation to him of the one excluded, but
whether he had, at the time, the capacity to do so....
"There is a clear distinction between having the capacity to
comprehend deserts and actually comprehending them-the
former the law requires, the latter it does not.... Care, there-
fore, should be taken by the courts to see that the distinction
mentioned is observed, for it is precisely the one that public
policy dictates and the law requires in order to preserve the
right and power of testamentary disposition."88
What public policy dictates that testators should have the power to
pauperize helpless dependents, the world is not advised. Perhaps,
the court was merely laboring under a jurisprudence of conceptions.
Indeed, one becomes quite convinced of it, when one discovers that
Kentucky courts have adopted the very judicial test that Arkansas
has repudiated. When wills are harsh, cruel and spiteful, the Ken-
tucky court does not have to resort, by way of apology, to that soft,
purring sentiment of ancient vintage that "Reliance can usually be
placed on the affections, independent of the law, which parents
have for their children, to recognize their claim..." to satisfy its
sense of decency.87
Let McDonald v. McDonald speak for Kentucky.88 The testator
was a man of wealth who had a great desire to make and save money.
-e was grasping and miserly. He believed if he could take his prop-
erty with him he would die happy. He didn't want his wife and
children to have a "damned dollar" of his estate. He threatened to
leave them his land so burdened with debt that it would take them
30 or 40 years to pay for it. He wanted to leave it so that they
would have to work like dogs to make a living out of it. Here was a
man whose mean, hateful, spiteful disposition of his property would
have justified all the superlatives that any court ever used in sus-
taining any will on the basis of the untrammeled power of a testator
to choose the objects of his bounty. His will was a mirror of the
malice of the man. How tenderly was it dealt with in Kentucky?
The court sustained the verdict of the jury for the contestants, his
children, in these words:
"He unquestionably had the mind to know his estate, and the
nature and value of it. He seems to have had a fixed purpose as to
the disposition of his estate, and that was to give his children as
little interest as possible.... It is as necessary, in order to have
testamentary capacity, for one to have such sensibilities as will -
81Taylor v. McClintock, supra note 79, P. 273.
8rPotter v. Jones, supra note 73, P. 257.
88120 Ky. 211, 85 S. W. 1084 (1905).
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enable him to know the obligations he owes to the natural
objects of his bounty, as for him to know the nature and value
of his estate, and a fixed purpose to dispose of it."89
One must know not only the natural objects of his bounty, but he
must realize his' duty toward them. Both are essential to testa-
mentary capacity. 0 So Kentucky speaks in consonance with common
sense. There is promise that this test, which courts can apply with-
out apoltgy, may gain currency. It was approved in Michigan in
i916,91 not quite ioo years after it was first enunciated. Some other
courts use the words "comprehend" and "appreciate" conjunctively
in speaking of testamentary capacity. 2 Inasmuch as the words are
not used by way of contrast, the language seems to have been un-
conscious rather than intended.
THE SENSIBLE AND SYMPATHETIC JURY
The jury is instructed that the law is that a testator may "dispose
of his property regardless of the ties of nature and relationship, and in
defiance of the rules of justice or the dictates of reason; and no senti-
mental considerations of love and affection that should actuate a man
in dealing with his own blood can be decisive."93 The jury is charged
that a will is not to be upset because its provisions may seem "un-
reasonable, unnatural, foolish or unjust."' ' But, despite the law and
the court, Redfield has advised us, the common sense instincts of the
jury are likely to lead them right in cases of this character. It is not
easy to save an absurd will from a sensible jury.95 Yet, courts com-
plain that to set aside a will is a serious matter.96 In i916, a jury in
North Carolina was instructed
"that the dependent condition of the wife of the deceased, and
her inability to take care of herself, was competent in corrobora-
tion of the evidence as to the mental capacity of the defendant,
since he devised the bulk of his property to the Christian Science
89Wbd. at 217.
90Frye's Ex'r v. Bennett, 189 Ky. 546, 547, 225 S. W. 499 (1920). See also,
Gay v. Gay, 183 Ky. 238, 241, 209 S. W. ii, 13 (1919).
9 1Porter v. La Rue, 192 Mich. 477, 479, i58 N. W. 851 (1916).
92Havens v. Mason, 78 Conn. 410, 412, 62 Atl. 6i5 (i9O5); Sayre v. Trustees of
Princeton Univ., 192 Mo. 95, 128, 90, S. W. 787, 797 (1905); In re Campbell's
Estate, 136 N. Y. Supp. io86, 1097 (1912); In re Smith's Estate, 112 Misc. 165,
184 N. Y. Supp. I43, 144 (i92o).
93Barry v. Graciette, 71 S. W. 309, 311 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902).
9'Estate of Higgins, i56 Calif. 257, 265, IO4 Pac. 6 (i909).
95SEDFIELD, Op. cit. supra note 21, p. 77, note.
961n re Carson's Estate, 74 Calif. App. 48, 63, 239 Pac. 364, 371 (1925).
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people, leaving his wife and daughter who supported him for
many years practically destitute."9 7
A sensible and sympathetic jury found against the will, much to the
disgust of a dissenting judge. He railed at the admission of the in-
competent testimony of one witness, who said "that any man who
makes such a will must be crazy."98
In the Institutes,99 Justinian tells us that if a child is disinherited by
a parent, he may impeach the will "as undutious, under the pretext
that the testator was of unsound mind at the time of the execution.
This does not mean that he was really insane, but the will, though
legally executed, bears no mark of that affection to which a child is
entitled." The presumption was a fiction. It was, however, con-
clusive.10 Courts in the various states are constantly reminding us
that the Roman law doctrine of inofficious wills has no application.
Yet, by a similar fiction the same result is often reached. The law in
books becomes very different from the law in action.
Nearly 20 years ago, Dean Pound asked to what purpose was the
extensive power of the jury recognized. His answer was
"Practically the purpose is, in largest part, to keep the letter
of the law the same in the books, while allowing the jury free rein
to apply different rules or extra-legal considerations in the
actual decision of causes-to create new breaches between law
in the books and law in action. The occasion is that popular
thought and popular action are at variance with many of the
doctrines and rules in the books...."101
Juries merely preserve the appearance of the legality of a rule of law
which they disregard. Ehrlich has said that lawyers are inclined
to assume that the rule of decision is a faithful expression of how
things are actually done.10 2 Courts realize that an unjust, unreason-
able, cruel will usually involves a question of competency. "Of
course juries lean against wills which seem to them unequal and un-
just." 03 Vigorously courts declare that a person has a right to dis-
97In re Straub's Will, 172 N. C. 138, 139, 90 S. E. 119, 121 (1916).
Other cases in which the question of dependency entered in the will are Davis v.
Babb, 19o Ind 173, 125 N. E. 403 (1920); In re Townsend's Estate, 122 Iowa, 246,
97 N. W. iio8 (19o4); Convey v. Murphy, 146 Iowa, 154, 124 N. W. 1073 (1910);
Rudy v. Ulrich, 69 Pa. 177 (1871); Aylward v. Briggs, 145 Mo. 604, 47 S. W. 510
(1898).
gIit re Straubs Will, supra note 97, P. 142. 9ii:I8, pr. (Moyle's 5 th ed.).
001n re Allen's Estate, 230 Mich. 584, 595, 203 N. W. 479 (1925).
'
01Law in Books and Law in Action (igio) 44 A. L. R. 13, 18. See also, INTER-
PRETATION OF LEGAL HisTORY (1923) 130.
102Freedom of Judicial Decision: Its Principles and Objects, SCIENCE OF LEGAL
METHOD (Mod. Leg. Phil. Ser.) 80.
10In re McDervitt, supra note 42, p. 33.
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inherit his relatives and affirm the verdict of the jury in which they
found the testator incompetent.-4
"The right to dispose of one's property, disinheriting any one
or all of his or her children, is not controverted in the least degree,
but where the capacity in the testator to dispose of his property
to any one is raised by the issue, then the circumstances enu-
merated are highly useful to the jury in their search for the truth
of the matter.""u 5
Mr. Justice Lamm, who declared that a testator had the right to
disinherit a helpless dependent, suggested that the unhappy distribu-
tion of property made by an unnatural will might be "tempered and
toned down" by the trier of facts.1"' Where social opinion has not
prevented testators from employing a too arbitrary exercise of their
power, the verdicts of juries have had some effect in this direction.0 7
Rood suggests that human nature in courts and juries alike is prone
to seek an excuse to deny effect to wills which seem unjust. A finding
that the testator was insane serves the purpose. 08 Occasionally some
court will insipidly suggest
"The justice and righteousness of his final dealings with those
who are the natural objects of his bounty and toward whom he
has assumed solemn duties and obligations are to be determined
by the final judge of all human conduct."'0 9
A jury, which is more concerned with justice here than hereafter,
under the influence of such counsel, may very properly prefer to
consider
"that as long as dndnesg is esteemed a virtue by civilized people,
their laws can neither be interpreted as essentially unkind nor
are they of such sour complexion and so deadly cold in their
processes as to eliminate all human warmth of sentiment and all
moral duty."" 0
The jury may well regard the absolute power of the testator over his
property merely as law in the abstract, even though some courts
denounce them as "wild.""' The very fact that there has been such
abundant litigation over capricious and arbitrary wills is the best
evidence of the futility of the intemperate exaltation by the courts of
the testator's absolute dominion over his property. The judicious
-0In re Carroll's Estate, 59 Mont. 403, 196 Pac. 996 (1921).
IoI11 re Burns' Will, 121 N. C. 336, 338, 28 S. E. 519 (1897).
IOGSupra note i, p. 88. 107Supra note 8, p. 116.
1'0RooD, WILLS (2d ed. 1926) 93.
109Tyner v. Varien, 97 Minn. 181, 182, lO6 N. W. 898 (i9o6).
noSupra note i, p. 87.
mWoodward v. James, 3 Strobh. L. 552, 556, 51 Am. Dec. 649,652 (S. C. 1849).
"A general right to consider whether a will offends against natural justice,
without defining what is meant by the term, releases all brakes and permits the
jury to run wild." In re Allen, supra note 39, P. 593.
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results obtained by the finders of fact expose the injudicious pro-
nouncements of the court.12
CONCLUSION (1)
It is evident that the rule of law which gives absolute dominion to
the testator over his property is one to which courts still tenaciously
cling. But, it is frequently only an abstract rule of law. In practice,
it so often shocks common decency that the will is denominated an
unnatural will, a term of vague import. The unnatural will is
freighted with the doctrine of presumptions or burden of proof; or
suspicions of mental aberration or undue influence are cast upon it; or
appreciation, in addition to comprehension, is made the test of
testamentary capacity. Finally, the will is submitted to the jury
where it is very apt to receive the fate it deserves, with or without
judicial approval.
I. WHEN A TESTATOR DISINHERITS HIS HELPLESS DEPENDENTS,
IS HIS ESTATE LIABLE FOR THEIR SUPPORT?
In speaking of the right of a parent, Blackstone said:113
"Our law has made no provision to prevent the disinheriting of
children by will: leaving every man's property in his own disposal,
upon a principle of liberty in this as every other action; though
perhaps it had not been amiss if the parent had been bound to
leave to them at least a necessary subsistence."
But Blackstone agreed with Grotius that a natural right obliged every
parent to give the necessary maintenance to children."4 According
to Kent,"5 writers on general law concede the right of parents to dis-
pose of their property as they please, after providing for the necessary
maintenance of their infant children and those adults who are not of
sufficient ability to provide for themselves. But said Kent,
"A father may at his death, devise all his estate to strangers,
and leave his children upon the parish; and the public have no
remedy by way of indemnity against the executor. 'I am Sur-
prised,' said Lord Alvaney, 'that should be the law of any
country, but I am afraid that it is the law of England'."
An examination of the case of Rawlins v. Goldfarb"6 shows that Kent
stated almost verbatim the law to be as it was declared by the Master
mWoerner says: "A fruitful source of litigation is found in the capricious and
arbitrary dispositions often made in wills, to the grievance and unjust deprivation
of heirs at law; the readiness with which juries seize upon slight pretexts, flimsy
proof of 'undue influence', etc., to set aside such unjust wills, is indicative of a deep
seated ethical aversion to the power of arbitrarily diverting the natural channel of
the devolution of property." AmERIcAN LAW OF ADImiSTRATION (3d ed., 1923) 7.
U3Loc. cit. supra note 4. ll4bid, p. 448.
ns2 COMMENTARIES (14th ed. 1896) 203. Puffendorf is cited.
1165 Ves. Jr. 44o, 444 (Ch. i8OO).
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of Rolls. It is to be noted the decision of Lord Alvaney bears
the date 18oo.
In 19o6, when Mr. Justice Lamm declared that a father had the
legal right to leave his infant child a pauper, he was merely stating the
law as he got it from Blackstone or as Kent got if from Lord Alvaney.
in 1926, a New York court was confronted by the same problem.
In Rice v. Andrews,n 7 an attempt was made to have the cost of
maintenance of a minor child declared a lien upon the assets of the
estate. It appears that the testator had an estate valued at about
$30,000. le left a child of seven the object of charity. The child's
sole offence was that he was the issue of an unhappy marital venture.
The question was whether the testator had the right to pauperize his
infant son. The court, with customary expressions of sympathy,
held'1 8 that if a father has chosen to cut him off, "such a child has no
claim against his father's estate for his support and maintenance, but
must shift for himself or be dependent upon others for his support."
In defence of the court which sustained the vicious conduct of the
testator, one writer suggests that the child's appeal loses much of its
force when it is remembered that the majority of children orphaned
in infancy have no inheritance." 9  It is diffcult to understand how the
prevalence of misfortune can ever justify any court in increasing its
currency. This case offered an opportunity to the court. It was
confronted by the problem of adjusting the law, shaped by the indi-
vidualism of the past to the ideals of social justice of the twentieth
century.2 0 The father's act was distinctly anti-social. The interests
of society in preventing the pauperization of a seven year old child are
greater than are its interests in the protection of the absolute right of a
testator to give vent to his malice entailing such social consequences.
One writer, in discussing facetiously the Immoralities of Wills,'' sug-
gests that the habit of wreaking posthumous vengeance merely
"argues a screw is loose in the testator's moral machinery."
In most cases, where helpless dependents have been pauperized by
the testator, the attack has been made upon the will. The compe-
tency of the testator has been put in issue. A typical case is found in
the Matter of Gregory which arose in New York in 1896.122 The testa-
'17127 Misc. 826, 217 N. Y. Supp. 528 (1926).
s
8
-bid. 827, 530.
119(1927) 3o LAW NOTES 222, 223.
20Pound, Organization of Courts (1927) II JouR. Am. JuD. Soc. 69, 72; Pound,
Courts and Legislation (1913) 7 Am. POL. Sci. R v. 361, 38o; Borgnis v. Falk, r47
Wis. 327, 349, 133 N. W. 2o9 (1911).
aHumorous Phases of the Law (1870) 2 ALB. L. J. 227, 229.
mI5 MisC. 407, 37 N. Y. Supp. 925 (1896).
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tor had cohabited with a woman in France. He had six illegitimate
children by her. He returned to New York and apparently brought
with him only one little daughter, whom he adopted. She was then
ten years old. Shortly afterward he died leaving a will, which he had
made five years before he adopted her. She was left penniless. She
attacked the will. Her case was easily disposed of on the ground
that the right of inheritance of an adopted child is like that of any
other child subject to the testamentary power of the testator. Fre-
quently, it is suggested that such cases of dependency are rare.M
Rare is a relative word. When the attack is made on a will on the
grounds of competency, one cannot always discover from the reports
whether there were helpless dependents. To say that they are rare is
pure speculation. The reports show that where the testator has
encountered marital difficulties on his second matrimonial venture,
his helpless minor children are apt to suffer. In a Kentucky case, the
testator was sued for divorce by his second wife.'m Pending the
action, he died-leaving to a three year old daughter by the second wife
$2,o00 provided she did not die without children before 21 years of
age. The value of the estate exceeded $25,ooo. The residue was left
to his two adult children by his first wife, subject to the right of
dower of the second wife. Despite the fact that public dependency
of his infant daughter was only a possibility because the mother had a
dower interest in lands, the court said that that fact alone was suffi-
ceint to show that the testator had ceased to look naturally at things
either from disease or other causes.
It may be true that a competent testator can disinherit his son
who is a helpless imbecile.m The validity of a will cannot be depend-
ent upon the vices or virtues of a testator."' The validity of a will is
not dependent upon whether a minor child is a dependent and is not
provided for by the will. m2 But, the vital question is: Is the testa-
mentary power of a testator limited by social considerations which
prevent him from making his helpless dependents the objects of
charity?
'OEditorial, New York Times, Feb. II, 1928, at I6.
24Walls v. Walls, 99 S. W. 969 (Ky. 1907).
nit re DeBaun's Estate, 2 Con. Surr. 304, 9 N. Y. Supp. 807 (I89O). The
testator left all his property to his second wife. He was her fourth husband. He
left penniless an adult son, who was born an imbecile.
n6Den v. Gibbons, 2 Zab. 117, 141 (N. J. 1849).
'rKustus v. Hagar, 269 Pa. 103, HO, 112 Atl. 45 (1920). See also Cunniff v.
Cunniff, 255 11. 407, 4o9, 99 N. E. 654 (1912); Heath v. Koch, 74 App. Div.
338, 77 N.Y. Supp. 513, 514 (1902).
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THE LIMITS OF TESTAIIENTARY POWER
It may be that a man may, by will, indulge his spite and display his
vindictive sentiments as much as he pleases,2 8 but he cannot defeat
his creditors. 29 To the prejudice of the rights of a creditor, he cannot
direct in his will the payment of a large sum for past services, when no
such services were ever rendered. 30 Indeed, a Kansas case suggests
that no testamentary disposition can interfere with either the rights
of creditors or persons dependent upon the testator for support."1
When the question is whether the child may be excused from school
for religious exercises, the New York 12 court cries "The child is not the
mere creature of the state." When the question is: May a father
pauperize his helpless child by will?, the court makes the child a
creature of charity and merely expresses its sympathy. Yet, in New
York, a minor's estate is properly charged with the expense of saving
the mother from a pauper's grave. Otherwise, it would be a scandal
upon the law. "How could it be otherwise in a refined system of
jurisprudence in a civilized country?" said the New York court 1
Blackstone cast doubt upon the policy of the law which enabled the
ancestor, in his dotage and caprice, to disinherit heirs."4 Clearly, the
welfare of society demands that the law should limit the power of the
dead to control human affairs."' In the light of the problem under
discussion, it is interesting to note the attitude of Mr. Justice Cooley
toward the power of testamentary disposition.
"But the right to give property by will is conferred for the very
reason that the owner is supposed to make in his particular case,
a better distribution of his estate than could be made by any un-
varying rule; that he knows who by their needs, their affection,
their care and solicitude for his welfare, their kind regard for
himself and for those to whom he has been attached, and by the
thousand and one circumstances naturally operating upon the
mind, should be remembered in his bounty .... better than any
general legislation can possibly provide."1 3
Such a characterization of the power assumes that it will not be exer-
128Hagen v. Yates, I Dem. 584, 596 (N. Y. 1883).
"'DAViDS, NEW YORK LAW OF WiLLs (1924) 1697. SCHOULER, WMLS
EXECUTORS AND ADMINiSTRATORS (6th ed. 1923) § 2703.
13Chamberlain's Estate, 54 Pa. Super. Ct. 434, 438 (1913).
"Horder v. Horder, 23 Kan. 391, 392, 33 Am. Rep. 167, 168 (188o).
12People v. Graves, 127 Misc. 135, 215 N. Y. Supp. 632, 637 (1926).
1Matter of Connolly, 88 Misc. 405, 407 (r914). For comment, see (1915) 15
COL. L. REv. 281.
13"2 COMM. 373.
"'Scott, Control of Property by the Dead (1917) 65 U. PA. L. REV. 527.
136'Fraser v. Jennison, 42 Mich. 206, 229, 3 N. W. 882 (1879).
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cised in. an anti-social way.13 7 How strangely it contrasts with the
bewildering medley of sentiments of the Pennsylvania court!
"The law wisely acquires equality of distribution" where a man
dies intestate. But the very object of a will is to produce inequal-
ity, and to provide for the wants of the testator's family; to pro-
tect those who are helpless; to reward those who have been
affectionate, and to punish those who have been disobedient.
It is doubtless true that narrow prejudice sometimes interferes
with the wisdom of such arrangements. This is due to the
imperfections of our human nature. It must be remembered
that in this country a man's prejudices are a part of his liberty.
He has the right to them .... 1 3 8
All private rights have a social setting. They are influenced by social
considerations, although they are designed to secure individual inter-
ests.'39 To hold that the law guarantees to a man his right to his
prejudices to the extent of pauperizing a child of tender years is a
folly in which the law does not always indulge itself.
JUDICIAL LIMITATIONS ON RIGHTS
As early as 1767, Lord Mansfield declared that conditions in re-
straint of marriage are odious.140 Unqualified restrictions upon it are
void.'4' Courts tell us that the basis of the doctrine is discovered in
the "common weal and the order of society."' The restrictions are
void although not express. The law favors marriage as an institution
fundamental to society.'4 It appears, at times, to be less interested
in the product of marriage.
At other times, the law is highly regardful of the rights of children.
One Ham, a citizen of Texas,'" had three boys, aged 12, 13 and 15
years. He found their care rather irksome, so he emancipated them.
But the court found them to be dependent children. In Texas, a man
can't evade his responsibility that way. He has to die to do it. 14 In
Missouri, a husband divorced one wife and took unto himself a second.
He desired to rid himself of the expense of maintaining an infant child
13La Ban v. Vanderbilt, 3 Redf. Surr. 384, 422 (N. Y. 1879).
13 Cauffman v. Long, 82 Pa. 72, 77 (1876).
139IHERING, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END (I913) 54, 97.
14°Long v. Dennis, 4 Burr. 2052, 2055 (K. B. 1767).
141JARMAN, WILLS (6th ed., 19IO) 1525; PAGE, WILLS (2d ed., 1926) § 1147;
GREENHOOD, PUBLIC POLICY (1886) 478-493;(I878) 7 CENT. LJ. 223;2 REDFIELD,
supra note 21, at 292 ff.
4'4 Hogan v. Curtin, 88 N. Y. 162, 170 (1882), which is cited with approval in
Matter of Seaman, 218 N. Y. 77, 8I, 112 N. E. 576 (I916).
"
3Demogue, Gifts Conditioned on Marrying or Not Marring (1923) I8 ILL.
L. REv. 37, 40.
'"Snell v. Ham, I51 S. W. 1077, io8o (Tex. Civ. App. 1912).145Perry v. Rogers, 52 Tex. Civ. App. 594, 598, 114 S. W. 897 (1908).
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by his first wife, so attempted to give all his property to his second
wife. But, in Missoturi,146 one cannot divest himself of his property
that way so as "to leave his tender female offspring to the cold regard
of public charity."
An antenuptial agreement that seeks to relieve a husband of all his
pecuniary marital obligations is void. The fundamental obligation
of marriage is that the wife and children shall have support. 47 By an
agreement with his wife, a husband cannot throw off the obligation to
support his children.1 48 As against the children and the public he is
liable. The obligation of a father to supl5ort his child is a continuing
duty, against which the statute of limitations will not run during the
time that the child needs support.149 A father cannot make a valid and
irrevocable contract which will relieve him from the obligation to
maintain, support and educate his child. 150
The paramount consideration in determining the validity of a
provision in a marriage contract is the welfare of the child. 51 A father
cannot divest himself of the right to control his child by giving her
away. 112 Nor can a husband and wife make a contract regarding the
custody and maintenance of their child which a court is bound to
enforce. 5 '
But a father can create a continuing debt for the support of his
minor children after his death which will constitute a claim against
his estate.'- An agreement by a father to support his children during
their minority is binding on his estate after his death. 5 These con-
tracts are not void because there is no reason in public policy to
prevent his doing so.'
'
46White v. White, 18o S. W. ioo4, 1005 (Mo. App. x915).
147 fDennison v. Dennison, 52 Misc. 37, 41, ioz N. Y. Supp. 621 (igo6).
'
48Michaels v. Flach, IX4 Misc. 225, 186 N. Y. Supp. 889 (i92i); af'd, 197 App.
Div. 478, x89 N.Y. Supp.9o8 (1921); In re Stowell, 172 App. Div. 684, I59 N. Y.
Supp. 84 (i916); Hazard v. Taylor, 38 Misc. 774, 78 N. Y. Supp. 828 (1902);
Courtwright v. Courtwright, 40 Mich. 633 (879).
149Fernandez v. Aburrea, 42 Calif. App. 131, 132, 183 Pac. 366, 367 (i919).
150Harper v. Tipple, 21 Ariz. 41, 45, 184 Pac. ioo5, 1007 (I919); In re Scarrett,
76 Mo. 565, 584 (1882).
16Brewer v. Cary, 148 Mo. App. 193, 207, 127 S. W. 685 (igio).
1mn re Scarrett, supra note i5o.
1'Edelson v. Edelson, 179 Ky. 300, 313, 2oo S. W. 625 (I9,8).154Note, (1913) 48 L. R. A. (N. s.) 429.
mStone v. Bagley, 75 Wash. 184, 194, f34 Pac. 820 (1913).
156McCloskey v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 202 Mo. App. 28, 213 S. W. 538
(I919); Maxwell v. Boyd, 123 Mo. App. 334, 338, 100 S. W. 54o; Barnes v. Kug,
129 App. Div. 192, 195, 113 N. Y. Sipp. 325 (i9o8).
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It is conceded that courts will refuse to enforce contracts which are
vicious in themselves. 157 It is clear that the doctrine that contracts
are void if against public policy is one of purely judicial creation.15 8
What is public policy? In a California case, the court said:
"An exact definition of public policy would be difficult to
formulate. One that has been frequently approved is that
adopted by Lord Brougham, namely that no one can lawfully
do anything which has a tendency to be injurious to public wel-
fare. The application of the principle to a given state of facts
is not always easy, though it admits of some degree of latitude.
Public policy often changes as the law changes. It is manifest,
therefore, that there can be no single or fixed standard governing
it.... It is primarily the prerogative of the Legislature to
declare what contracts and acts shall be unlawful; but courts
following the spirit and genius of the law, written and unwritten,
of a state, may decree void as against public policy contracts,
which, though not in terms specifically forbidden by legislation,
are clearly injurious to society.'n59
If a contract is at war with the interests of society or is in conflict
with the morals of the time, 6 ' it is void and courts do not hesitate to
declare it so. The test is not whether the contract has in fact resulted
in injury to the interests of society, but whether its tendency is that
such injury will result.'61 Have" the courts been as keenly sensitive
to social interests in restricting the right of the testator in disposing of
his property?
WILLS VOID AS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY
It is agreed that a testator may dispose of his property by will
subject only to such limitations as sound public policy may dictate.162
If capacity, formal execution, and volition appear, the will of the
most impious must stand unless there is something, not in the motives
which led to the disposition, but in the actual disposition, against
15 7Craig v. U. S. Health and Accident Ins. Co., 80 S.. 151, 61 S. E. 423 (1908).15 8Cohen, Process of .Judicial Legislation (1914) 48 Am. L. R. 161, 170.
159Maryland Casualty Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 71 Calif. App. 492, 496,
236 Pac. 210, 212 (1925).
1606 R. C. L. 712; Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Moore, 3 Fed. (2d) 652, 653 (1925);
Jones v. Am. Home Finding Assn., 191 Iowa 211, 213, 182 N. W. 191 (1921);
Liggett v. Shriver, I8i Iowa 26o, g65, 164 N. W. 611, 612 (1917); Huber v. Culp,
46 Okla. 570, 575, 149 Pac. 216 (1915).
'Jones v. Am. Home Finding Assn., supra note 169, at 213; Oliverv. Wilder, 27
Colo. App. 337, 343, 149 Pac. 275 (1915); Firemen's Charitable Assn. v, Berg-
haus, 13 La. Ann. 209 (1858); Lesieur v. Inhab. of Rumford, 113 Me. 317, 320, 93
Atl. 838 (r915); Win. J. Burns Detective Agency v. Doyle, 46 Nev. 91, 96, 208
Pac. 427, 429 (1922).
112 johnson v. Shaver, 41 S. D. 585, 593, 172 N. W. 676, 677 (1919).
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good morals and against public policy.1 3 An English court doubted
whether a provision in a will that the body of the testator, when dead,
should be burnt on a pile of wood, was not an unlawful purpose.' A
provision in a will that the residue of the testator's money and other
evidence of credit should be destroyed was held void."'
The seventh edition of Swinburne's treatise on wills was published
in 18o 3 . He says that a testator cannot command what is wicked, or
against justice, piety, equity and honesty.6 6 Since then most writers
have said that wills subversive of sound policy and good morals are
void. 16 7 Courts have repeated the phrase. There seem to be practi-
cally no decisions on the point. The Century and Decennial Digests
record one case since the Civil War period. 6 It relates to the
validity of the will of a testator who made it while contemplating
suicide. 69 Seven other cases have been adjudicated in our history.
They related to the emancipation of slaves. Generally, it may be
said that there are no pertinent precedents for wills which are void
because against public policy, excepting, of course, wills the validity
of which are dependent upon questions involving restraint upon
alienation. 7 0
Why has there been in the law of wills such a dearth of precedent?
The explanation may be found in the language of one court,'7 ' which
said "The wishes of the dead are more sacred than the dispositions of
the living." When a disposition amounts to the deprivation of the
support of the testator's helpless dependent, it is difficult to perceive
its sacred quality. It seems that only maudlin sentiment can support
it on that ground. At least, upon one occasion, under the mantel of
natural rights, the Wisconsin court heartily endorsed the sentiment. 72
3Den v. Gibbons, 2 Zab. 117, 153, 5r Am. Dec. 253, 256 (N. J. 1849).
'"Williams v. Williams, 20 Ch. D. 659 (1881).
'
6
'Bd. of Com. v. Scott, 88 Minn. 386, 93 N. W. io9 (i9o3).
"66TREATISE, TESTAMENTS AND LAST WILLS (7th ed. I803) 8.
"67SCHOULER, supra note 9, P. 510.
68KEY No., Wills, Nature and Extent of Testamentary Power, Illegality of object
or purpose, DECENNIAL § 18, CENTURY § 46.
"'Roche v. Nason, io5 App. Div. 256, 93 N. Y. Supp. 565 (19o5), aff'd, I85
N. Y. 128, 77 N. E. oo7 (I9O6). This is the only case cited by Davids to
illustrate wills against public policy. Supra note 129, §538.
"'°PAGE, supra note 141, §§ 1094 and 1O95.
"'In re Tracy's Will, 3 N.Y. S. R. 239,249 (1886). See also, Barbour v. Moore,
4 App. D. C. 535, 547 (1894).
72In Will of Rice, 15o Wis. 4o1, 444, 136 N. W. 956 (1912) the court said, "The
right to make a will is more sacred than the right to make a contract." See also,
Herron v. Stanton, 79 Ind. App. 683, 689, 147 N. E. 305 (1922).
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Perhaps, the more acceptable explanation may be found in the caustic
comment of Kansas. In De Crow v. larkness,'"' the court said
"Amidst all the theories of all the schools of social economics
practical people have not yet gone beyond the fundamental
theory of the real ownership of property and the right to dispose
thereof as the owner sees fit."
This pronouncement was made in 1917. It is evidence of the tena-
cious adherence of some courts to ancient ideals despite the change
in social conditions.
The sublime inconsistency of these staunch defenders of testatorial
absolutism is an amazing spectacle. In California, 74 one McNally,
bachelor, aged 54, agreed with his niece that if she would care for him
he would give her all his property at his death. She performed the
service until 1893, when he married. Shortly thereafter he died.
She sought specific performance of the contract. California is a state
of testatorial liberty, where a man may make a will as cruel and harsh
and unjust as he pleases. The court denied relief to the niece, saying:
"If it was within their contemplation, and the contract em-
braced the taking of the deceased's entire estate to the exclusion
of any future wife or child, then we have no hesitation in saying
that the contract was void against public policy.' 75
In New York, where a testator may pauperize a seven year old son, a
man can't deprive himself by contract of the power to bequeath or
devise by will the property of which he is owner at his death to the
exclusion of his children.17 6 Man's beastliness, his anti-social conduct
will not receive judicial approval if it is by way of contract. It must
be by will, because the contract is repugnant to public conscience. 7
In Texas, 78 each and every citizen has the absolute right to dispose
of his property by will "regardless of the ties of nature and relation-
ship, and in defiance of the rules of justice or the dictates of reason".
But, when a father surrenders the custody of his nine year old son
under hn agreement that the son was to be made heir to all the testa-
tor's property at his death, the contract is void.179 The court said:
"The law should not encourage the relinquishment by parents
of their children and the renunciation of a sacred relation im-
posed by nature merely for the child's enrichment by placing the
seal of validity upon a contract in which a paient in effect barters
173IOO Kan. 144, 156, 163 Pac. 630 (1917).
1740wens v. McNally, 113 Calif. 444, 45 Pac. 710, (1896).
17-IbId. P. 454.
176Gall v. Gall, 64 Hun, 6oo, ig N. Y. Supp. 332, 335 (1892).
177Koberg v. Teller, IO3 Misc. 641, 17 N. Y. Supp. 947, 948 (1918).
17BStolle v. Kenetsky, 220 S. W. 557, 559 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
170Hooks v. Bridgewater, 1ii Tex. 122, 229 S. W. 1114 (1921).
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his children away for a property return. It is more concerned in
fostering and maintaining that relation and guarding its valua-
ble and wholesome influences than the child's financial prosperity.
Let it once be held that a parent's contract of this kind is valid
and may be enforced, and every parent will be free to transfer
his children to any one willing to pay them well for the bargain.
We are unwilling to subscribe to such a doctrine. It tends to the
destruction of one of the finest relations of human life, to the
subversion of the family tie and to the reversal of an ordering of
nature which is essential to human happiness and the security of
society. It reduces parental duty and the child's welfare to the
sordid level of financial profit, and would license the easy sur-
render of that duty for merely the child's financial advantage."'8 0
This is an exalted conception of the parental relation. The policy of
the court is in harmony with the emphasis which is now placed upon
the welfare of the child in dealing with questions of custody. One
commends the significance which is given to parental obligation.
But, the world would have denied this tribute if the case before the
court had involved the will of the father in which the nine year old son
had been cut off, a penniless orphan. The court could have only ex-
tended the child its sympathy because the almhouse' s5 , would provoke
no such tribute. The law of wills and the law of contracts are different.
Judicial disquisitions on parental obligations lie in the field of con-
tracts in Texas.
The Ma#er of Eddy's Will18 is an excellent illustration of the judi-
cial indifference to the social problem involved. It is an ire-rousing
case. Eddy had five minor children at the time that his wife died.
Forthwith, he deserted them and went to live with a married woman.
Si4 years later, he died leaving his entire estate to his paramour.
His five minor children contested the will. In their behalf, it was
urged that it was against public policy to allow a father to deprive
these children of support by such a will. The court felt that inas-
much as the father had not provided for the minors at any time during
the six years succeeding their mother's death that his parental affec-
tion had not been overcome. The court's impression was that how-
ever morally desirable it was to prevent a parent making such a will,
"the statute does not prohibit such action." The language of this
180.1b., p. 131.
180a"The almshouse was the first expression of the charitable impulse of the
community-a sort of catchall of victims of general misfortune. It was the public
answer of distress." Mpthers' Pensions, p. 794 ($ul. No.212,1U. S. Bur. of Labor
Statistics, 197).
18141 Misc. 283, 84 N. Y. Supp. 218 (1903).
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New York case contrasts notably with that of a Maine court.1' The
defendant was a man of large estate who, by his misconduct, had
broken up. his family and seemed disinclined to support his minor
children. The court said that the power of disinheritance of minor
children should be construed to apply "where the family relations
remain intact, and when there is no great danger that such an arbi-
trary power will be exercised." The New York court, in repudiating
the doctrine that public policy required the testator to provide for
his minor children, didn't seem to be able to perceive that there was a
distinction between the dependency of an adult wife and the dep~en-
dency of helpless infants.ss
THIS DUTY: WAS IT LUGISLATIVR?
As the court viewed the law, in Rice v. Andrews,'" it was powerless
to compel the estate of the father to support the lad or to interfere
with the father's power to dispose of the estate as he saw fit. The
remedy for the situation, according to the court, rested with the legis-
lature."" Dean Pound has again reminded us only recently that the
legislature is never able to do more than to define the law in its
broad, crude outlines." 6 The duty of the courts is to interpret laws in
the light of the legislative principles introduced. To avoid impossible
uniformity and rigor, says Professor Cohen, courts should give con-
tent to the law which will adapt it to the complicated needs of life.8 7
Courts should construe laws as integral parts of a legal system which
controls the whole of life. 8 Herein, the court, in Rice v. Andrews,
failed tragically. It relied entirely upon the statute that gave to the
testator the power to dispose of his property, completely oblivious of
the fact that it was inconsistent with many modem statutes equally
binding upon it, which were limitations upon that power. Repeatedly
Dean Pound has pointed out that the entire trend of modern legis-
lation has been to limit the power of the owner to dispose of his
2Miller v. Miller, 64 Me. 484 (x874). In this case, the court made a decree for
the care, custody and support of the minor children of the parties, binding on the
estate of the husband. It said, "To guard against the danger of a resentful dis-
inheritance of his children, should not the court possess the power to make a
decree that should be binding on his estate?... We think that no one will doubt
that such ought to be the law. We think that it is the law." p. 488.
1'Supra note I8i, p. 285.
1I127 Misc. 826, 217 N. Y. Supp. 528 (1926).
'8Ibid., p. 831.
1"POUND, SPIaRT OF THE COMMON LAW (192X) T74. See also, BROWN, AUSTIN-
IAN THEORY (1920) 307.
187Supra note 158, p. i85. 1 881bid. at 184.
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property to secure the interests of those dependent upon him.'89 There
may be times when it is the duty of the court not to speculate upon
the wisdom of the law but to apply it. 1 0 That assumes that the law
in a particular case is certain. There was no statute in New York
which said that a father could by will pauperize his helpless children.
It may be true that the policy of the law is what the statute enacts.
Suppose there is no enactment specifically covering the case. Then,
it is admitted that the policy of the law will change with the habits,
opinions and wants of the people.' 9' It will be different at different
times.'92 The failure to perceive that fact caused the New York
Court of Appeals to blunder and declare unconstitutional the Work-
men's Compensation Act. The repellant result reached in Rice v.
Andrews was so shocking to the layman that it may well have caused
the court to ponder upon the character of law. Is it fixed and rigid?
One court reminds us that it is its virtue that it is not, because the
"diversity in the facts of all human transactions affords frequent
illustration of the beauty and excellency of the common law, in
relieving the conscientious court from the abject submission to
precedents, which sometimes do violence to commonunderstand-
ings of both the learned and the unlearned."'93
Mr. Justice Cardozo has said that at times judges march to pitiless
conclusions under the prod of a remorseless logic which is supposed to
give them no alternative. They sacrifice their victim "to the gods of
jurisprudence on the altar of regularity."'9 4 The jurist's first need is
to become conversant with the problems which form the framework
of the law. They arise out of the conditions of human existence and
must ever be of prime importance, if humanity is to progress.'95
The law involves a "jurisprudence of realities." The method of the
modern era of law is to test legal precepts by the results produced in
their practical application. 9 ' It is the purposes of the law which
dictate the premises of legal reasoning and fix the limit of the
l89Supra note 186, p. 189; POUND, OUTLINES OF JURISPRUDENCE (ad ed. 1920)
43; POUND, Limits of Effective Legal Action (1917) 27 INT. JOUR. OF ETHICS i5o,
159.
1001n re Cruger's Will, 36 Misc. 477, 73 N. Y. Supp. 812, 816 (igoi).
191Samuel Stores, Inc. v. Abrams, 94 Conn. 248, 252, io8 Atl. 541, 543 (1919).
192Gordon v. Gordon's Adm'r, 168 Ky. 409,412, 182 S. W. 220 (1916); Turney v.
3. H. Tillman Co., 112 Or. 122, 132,228 Pac. 933 (1924), SCHOULER, supra note 9,
p. 511.
19'Patfl v. Ball, 31 Tex. io, 15 (1868).
'9GRowTH oF LAW (1924) 66.
295PHILLIPS, JURISPRUDENCE (1863) 26.
'
98Pound, Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence (1911) 25 HAV. L.
REV. i4o, 142.
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application of any legal rule.1'7 The positive law of any enlightened
age is estimated by the standard of its ideals. 98 The state exists for
the protection of the weak. 9 The question then is: Was there any
other premise which the court might have employed in Rice v.
Andrews, which would have yielded a result more consistent with the
spirit of modem legislative development?
MODERN SOCIAL LEGISLATION
The common law, so far as it related to the claims of the child
against the parent, presents a significant contrast to modern law.
Nearly a hundred years ago, in America, the law entered upon a
policy which extended its protection to the dependents in the family.
Within a quarter of a century, the legal recognition of the interests of
the child has been so intensified that ancient legal precepts have
become obsolete.
i. Statutory Allowances for Provisional Family Support. These
statutes, Woemer tells us, are of purely American origin and owe their
existence to a humane consideration of the distress and helplessness of
widows and orphans.200 They are limitations upon the testator's
power of disposition. Schouler says that they are designed to keep
the dependents of the deceased from becoming public charges.20 1
They have been adopted by most of the states of the Union.202 Their
very existence presupposes that the testator has made provision for
his dependents. They provide a temporary maintenance for depen-
dents until their interest in the estate can be set out. It prevents
them from being thrown as paupers upon the community or being left
to the "cold charity of relatives." '
This provisional support is not a mere charity.2 °4 It is a preferred
claim against the estate.20 5 It takes preference to any claim which a
197DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF THE LAW
(1927) 338.
'
99 VINOGRADOFF, COMMON SENSE IN LAW (1914) 247.
199Baldwin, State's Duty in Suits against Charitable Bequests (1896) 35 Am. L.
REG. (N. S.) 285, 287.
2001 WOERNER, AMERICAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION (3d ed. 1923) 234.
2
oSupra note 129, § 2650. See also, Wilcox v. Hawley, 31 N.Y. 648,657 (1864);
In re Lavinberg's Estate, 1o4 Wash. 515, 517, 177 Pac. 328 (1918).
202(1896) 2 Am. & ENG. ENc. LAW I56.
2'In re Williams, 52 N. Y. Supp. 700, 702 (1898); WOERNER, supra note 200,
p. 235.
204Busby v. Busby, 120 Iowa 536, 538, 95 N. W. 19i (19o3); Glover v. Glover,
215 Mass. 576, 577, 102 N. E. 945 (1913).2 59In re James' Estate, 38 S. D. 107, 112, 160 N. W. 525 (1916).
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creditor, heir, legatee or representative may have against the estate.
2 0
It recognizes a higher duty on the part of the deceased than the pay-
ment of any personal debt. 07 Courts will refuse to give such statutes
a narrow and rigid construction because they were designed to relieve
a helpless condition of the family20 8 Nor will they approve the at-
tempt to collect a transfer tax on such allowances, because such
interpretation is so unreasonable and contrary to the spirit of the
law. 209 But, the exemptions will be allowed even though the estate is
insolvent.210
The legislative history of the various states discloses that these
provisions have had a progressively liberal development. Although
New York may have been behind some of the other states in making
its exemptions adequate to the need,21' yet such a tendency is re-
vealed by an examination of the six amendments which have been
adopted by it since the enactment of the first statute in 1842.212
2. Promotion of the Welfare and Hygiene of Infancy. In 1921,
Congress enacted the Sheppard-Towner Act to promote the hygiene
of maternity and infancy.213 Under it over a million dollars a year
has been made available for distribution among the states. In order
to avail itself of this federal aid, the state must appropriate a sum
equal to the amount it receives in aid. Due to its tendency in the
diminution of infant mortality, this has been called one of the most
important social measures ever enacted by Congress. Intheyears1924,
1925 and x926, the State of New York appropriated over $240,000 in
order to avail itself of the maximum sum available to it as federal
aid.214 In other words, the Legislature declared by such appropriation
that it was vitally concerned in having the children of the State well-
born. Indeed, during the first few months of the operation of the law,
206WoERNER, supra note 200, p. 235. 2OT71'd. § 9.
208In re Pugsley, 27 Utah 489, 492, 76 Pac. 56o (19o4). See also, In reShedd's
Estate, 6o Hun, 367, 14 N. Y. Supp. 841, 843"(1891); In re Shulenburg's Estate,
14 Misc. 155, 187 N. Y. Supp. 251 (1921); In re Estate of Ryan, 174 Mo. App.
202, i56 S. W. 759 (1913); In re Drasdo's Estate, 36 Wash. 478, 78 Pac. 1022
(i904).
209Matter of Page, 39 Misc. 22o, 222, 79 N. Y. Supp. 382, 384 (1902).
2
'3Estate of Treat, 162 Calif. 250, 12i Pac. 1003 (1912). A provision of the
Code so provided. See Johnson v. Corbett, xi Paige 265, 276 (N.Y. x844).21Report of tle Commission to Investigate Defects in the Laws of Estates (No. 70,
LEG. Doc. New York, 1928) 2.
212BLISS' NEW YORK ANN. CODE (6th ed. 1912) § 2713.
21342 V. S. Stat. 224 (1921), c. 135.
214The Promotion of the Welfare and Hygiene of Maternity and Infancy (Pub. No.
178, Chilrden's Bureau, Dept. of Labor, X927) 2.
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42 states accepted the provisions of the act.2 15 After such a declara-
tion of social policy, how cananycourtof anyoneof thosestates, inthe
absence of a statute that specifically declares the right of a testator
to pauperize his minor child, say that infant pauperization by will
was the intent of the Legislature? Statistics show that, in certain
towns, infant mortality decreased from 147 to 87 and from 127 to
58.216 Why should some infants be rescued from death at the expense
of society,2 7 while others are pauperized by the will of a well-to-do
father under judicial sanction?
3. Compulsory Education and Child Labor Laws. One reads in a
bulletin of the United States Department of Labor that "Poverty and
ignorance are both the cause and effect of child labor." 218 In England,
in 18ig, the first legislation applying to other than pauper apprentices
was passedregulating child labor in factories. Itprohibited theemploy-
ment of children under nine. The working hours of children under 16
were limited to 12. In 1918, a century later, England passed for a
first time an act for the regulation of the employment of children in all
gainful occupations. It prohibits the employment of all children
under 12. Compulsory full-time school attendance is required of all
children up to 14 years of age. Compulsory continuation school
attendance is required up to 16 years of age, and is to be raised to 18 at
the end of seven years from the time the continuation school section
becomes effective. 219
In United States, prior to 183 o , there was no effective regulation of
child labor. In 1813, Connecticut passed a law providing for the
education of working children by proprietors of manufacturing
establishments in which children were employed1 0 By I86o, four
states had enacted similar laws. From decade to decade, the stand-
ards of regulation have been gradually raised.2 1 By 192o, every state
in the Union had a compulsory education law. In i91o, a decade
before, there were seven states without such laws.2 During that
same decade, 22 states had enacted a new type of legislation, provid-
ing for part time education. In that same period, the children en-
21SWorking of the Federal Maternity and Infancy Act, (1925) 22 SCHOOL
AND SocIETY 742; Baker, The First Year of the Sheppard-Towner Act (1924) 52
SURVEY 89.
216Federal Maternity and Infancy Act (1927); 75 REVIEW OF REVIEWS 98.
217Supreme Court Hearing on Constitutionality of Sheppard-Towner Act (1923) 24
IND. ED. M. 356.
2lSChild Labor (No. 93, U. S. DEPT. OF LABOR, 1923) 19.
2195bid p. 2 20 bid P. 4. 221 bid p. x.
-Child Labor in the United States (No. 1i4, U. S. DEPT. OF LABOR, 1926) r4.
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gaged in the gainful occupations of the United States had decreased
46%. In New York, the decrease was 23%.2 In 27 states, com-
pulsory school attendance is required throughout the state up to the
age of i6. In 13 states, the upper age limit is 17 or i8 years, in at least
some localities. But in most states, the law allows children above
the age of 14 to be excused to go to work.22
In an early New York case (1868), the court assumed that a boy of
14 who was cut off by his father's will was able to support himself. 25
In Rice v. Andrews, the court seeks to justify its decision on the ground
that death had deprived the father of his obligation to support the
seven year old son because the father could no longer enjoy the
services and society of his little son. His estate cannot stand in his
shoes in this regard. The consideration which made the father
liable for support vanished at his death.ns It is interesting to note
that this same argument was used in Georgia to relieve the insane
parent of the obligation to support a minor daughter. Of course, an
insane parent cannot enjoy the company and services of a minor
dependent.227 The court held that did not relieve the parent of the
obligation to pay for its support. The same ancient argument was
used in 1871, in Iowa, when a father asserted that his right to the
services of his child was a sufficient excuse for both the child's tardi-
ness at and absence from school.228 The court thought otherwise.
"The services and society of the child during school hours can-
not be at the disposal of the father. If the parent would bestow
on his offspring the great benefits of an education, he must forego
the little profit of the child's labor and the pleasure of his constant
society." 2
29
If a father's estate is liable for the support of a minor child during
the period of its dependency, it is clear that it is liable only to the
extent of its dependency. So far as the earnings of the child may
contribute to its own support, it cannot, to that degree, be regarded
dependent. When a court is confronted with the problem of pauperiz-
ing a seven year old child on the one hand or holding the estate of the
father liable on the other, it is incredible that it should absolve the
=Supra note 218, see chart on pp. 14 and 15. For an interpretation of these
statistics to discover whether the decrease was real or apparent, see supra note
222, p. 12.
24Supra, note 222, p. 29.
_2Jackson v. Jackson, 39 N. Y. 153, 157 (I868).
226Supra note 117, p. 531.
27 BEllis v. Hewitt, 15 Ga. App. 693, 696, 84 S. E. 185 (I915).
228Burdick v. Babcock, 3z Iowa 562 (1871).2291bid., p. 568.
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estate on the ground that death had made impossible the enjoyment
of the society of the infant. It is too obviously an attempt to support
a bad decision by a worse argument. Indeed, by virtue of the law of
New York, in questions relating to custody, the courts will consider
the best interests of the child, regardless of yearning in the parental
breast for the society of the child.- 0 The court will deprive the
parent of the custody of a child whenever the interest of the child
and society d~mand it. So interested is society in the child that an
insolvent father can make a gift of the child's services to the child
even against the objection of his creditors.2'
In a state where it is unlawful to employ any child under 14 in any
service whatever during the hours when attendance upon instruction
is required, it seems clear that by legislative policy, the economic
interest of the father in the child is subordinated to the welfare of the
child and the interest of society in it. Every law relating to compul-
sory education and child labor has been in derogation of the father's
right of property in the services of the child. That legislation, like
child legislation in general, has been primarily for the protection of
the child. Why any court should seek to give effect to a principle of
law, which was enunciated by Kent and was based upon a decision
made by Lord Alvaney in i8oo, when that principle is in direct
opposition to the legislative policy of nearly a century, 2 taxes the
20N. Y. Ann. Cons. Laws (Cahill, 1923), c. 14, § 70.
"The principle rule, as laid down in a long line of cases, and which is estab-
lished beyond dispute, is that in a controversy under this section for the custody
of the child, the court will consider the best interests of the child, and will make
such order for its custody as will best promote its physical, moral, mental and
financial welfare." 14 McKinney's Cons. Laws of New York Ann., at 184.
In White v. McDowell, 74 Wash. 44, 47, 132 Pac. 734 (1913), the court said,
"We cannot recognize charity, however willingly bestowed, as a legal substitute
for the natural duty of a parent to maintain his minor child."
"The abuse of parental authority is the subject of judicial cognizance... and
when abuse is established the child may be freed from the dominion of the parent,
and the duty of support and education enforced." Calif. Civil Code (Kerr,
2d ed. 1920), § 203. See Hutchison v. Hutchison, 124 Calif. 677, 57 Pac. 674
(1899).
"It is not the policy of the law to deprive children of their rights on account of
the dissensions of their parents, to which they are not parties; or to enable the
father to convert his own misconduct into a shield against parental liability."
Leibold v. Leibold, 158 Ind. 6o, 61, 62 N. E. 627 (1902).
23Frauenthal v. Bank of El Paso, 17o Ark. 322, 280 S. W. 1001 (1926); Stanley
v. Nat. Union Bank, 115 N. Y. 122, 22 N. E. 29 (1889).
2nThe policy of the Legislature of New York to protect children from pauperi-
zation and exploitation may be found in EDUcATIoN LAW, § 626; LABOR LAW,
§§ 70, 93, 131, 161, 162, and 220; PENAL LAW, §§ 480, 482 and 485; POOR LAW,
§ 130.
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understanding. Doubtless such a situation would prompt Prof.
Dewey to say that an infiltration into the law of a more experimental
logic is a social as well as intellectual need.2
4. Workmen's Compensation Laws. One writer, in justifying the
disinheritance of minor children without other means of support,
suggests :24 "When the wage earner dies, poverty comes to his depend-
enfts." That may be true, if the wage earner does not die by accident
under Workmen's Compensation. Workmen's Compensation is
designed to protect the dependent and orphaned children.2 5 In
eighteen states, benefits under Workmen's Compensation are paid to
the dependent children of the deceased up to 16 years of age, while in
20 states they are paid up to 18 years of age."5  New York is included
among the latter group."7 In New York, then, a ridiculous situation
exists. A well-to-do father can die and by will pauperize his child.
But, if a father, a wage earner, dies from accident under Workmen's
Compensation, his employer has to contribute toward the support of
his child until it attains the age of i8 years. Or if it becomes a public
charge upon the City of New York, the department of public welfare
is authorized to collect the benefits to the extent of reasonable charges,
during the period of dependency, until the minor attains the age
of i8.21
In a recent Michigan case," 9 the court set out the doctrine of rea-
sonable parts as it was explained by Glanvil in the twelfth century.
In commenting upon it the court said that, so far as it related to chil-
dren, it had been obsolete so long that it was but a curiosity in legal
annals. The court must have been forgetful of the provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation Acts. The doctrine of reasonable parts
has been revived by statute. An interesting illustration of it is to be
found in a recent New York case.210
5. Mothers' Pensions. In i9io, it was discovered by a judge in
Missouri that dependent fatherless children are a matter of concern
to the state.241 In 1913, Missouri and Illinois enacted Mothers'
==Dewey, Logical Method and Law (1924) io CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 17, 27.
,Supra, note 1n9, p. 223.
n5Laube, Administrative Problems in Wisconsin's Workmen's Compensation
(1925) 3 Wis. L. REV. 65, 97.
nGComparison of Workmen's Compensation Laws of the United States, (Bul. No.
275, DEPT. OF LABOR, 1920) 65.
2 7N. Y. Ann. Cons. Laws (Cahill, 1923), C. 66, §§14a, 15-4.
2S81bid. 16, § 6. " 9Supra note 39, P. 594.
24 King v. N. Y. 0. & W. Ry., 213 App. Div. 509,21o N. Y. Supp. 655 (1925).
24'Craiger, Mothers on the Pay Roll in Many States .(1915) 52 REVIEW OF
REVIEWS 81; Fairbanks, Mothers' Pensions in Missouri (1914) CoNF. CHAR. &
CORRECTIONS 442.
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Pensions Acts. The object was to prevent the pauperization of worthy
children.2' The child, and not the mother, was the real beneficiary.
The maximum age of the child for whom a pension is payable is from
x4 to 18. This form of relief swept over the country with astonishing
rapidity. It was hailed as the most important contribution to the
modem social problem.2 3 Before four years had elapsed, 17 states
had established such relief. By 1923, it existed in 40 states.244 In
New York, Mothers' Pensions became a policy of the law by almost
unanimous vote of the Legislature of i9i5.24 The New York law
provides for relief for children up to 16 years of age.
In declaring the Mothers' Pensions Act constitutional, the North
Dakota court said:
".... the law is a monument of credit to the Legislature which
enacted it. Two of the most important, weighty, and far-
reaching problems with which the state has to deal are the public
health and the elimination of crime. It is a sociological truth
that if the environment of childhood is extreme poverty and
continual want and penury .... we may expect such an environ-
ment must of necessity waste the energies of childhood and sub-
ject it to the inroads of disease, which may be communicated to
part of the public. Meantime this continued want and misery
must weaken the moral fiber of childhood, at the very period in
life when the child's mind and being are most susceptible to
impressions, either good or bad."' ' 6
Indeed, the New York Legislature was advised prior to the enactment
of the Mothers' Pensions Act that "The problem of the prevention of
poverty is perhaps the most serious that confronts any civilized
community. "' 7 Mothers' Pensions were represented as the necessary
corollary to Anti-Child Labor and Compulsory Education Laws and
an essential part of the social code requisite to progress.248 It is, per-
haps, a sufficient commentary on the decision in Rice v. Andrews that
in the very year that court declared a father could pauperize his
helpless minor son by will, in seven cities of the State of New York
nearly $6,ooo,ooo of public funds were expended in the relief of
212 The Needy Mother and the Neglected Child (1913) 104 OUTLOOK 280; Shaw,
Progressive Law-making in Many States (1913) 48 RvEw OF REVIEWS 86.
24iMother's Pensions in New York (igi5) 50 LITERARY DIGEST 796.
24Bogne, Ten Years of Mothers' Pensions (1923) 49 SURVEy 634; Seventeen States
Pension Widows (1913) 30 SURVEY 450.
24 Pensions for Widows in New York (1915) 34 SURVEY I.
246Cass Co. v. Nixon, 35 N. D. 6Ol, 605, I6I N. W. 204, 205 (1917). See also,
In re Walker, 49 N. D. 682, 193 N. W. 250; State v. Klason, 123 Minn. 382, 143
N. W. 984; In re Koopman, 146 Minn. 36, 177 N. W. 777 (1920).
247(1914) Report of the New York Commission on Relieffor Widowed Mothers, at 15.
2418bid., p. 182.
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poverty among children in the form of Mothers' Pensions7' 9 If the
Judiciary is to cooperate as a coordinate department of government,
the object of its decisions ought not to be to intensify a problem which
the Legislature is attempting to solve. For fifteen years the legisla-
tive-policy of New York with reference to the pauperization of minors
has been unmistakably clear. Further legislative declarations would
seem superfluous except for the fact that courts still persistently and
indefensibly adhere to the vicious theory of absolut6 rights regardless
of its social consequences.
CONCLUSION (2)
The right of a testator to dispose of his property by will should be
interpreted, not only with reference to the statute relating to testa-
mentary dispositions, but with reference to every other pertinent
statute. To construe the right of the testator in New York in 1926
to be co-extensive with the right which was declared to exist in the
days of Kent is to ignore the most significant facts in American
legislative history. It is to apply an 6ncient principle, mechanically
and ruthlessly, yielding a grossly absurd result. The supremacy of
the law depends upon its application. Any theory that sanctifies the
old, widens the gap between social conditions and the law. It breeds
disrespect for law. Modem legislation has limited the right of the
individual in his anti-social exercise of the rights of ownership. It is
said that the greatness of Papinian depended upon his ability to dis-
cover the relevancies of humanity in any case. Indeed, President
Frank has declared the great lawyer is the one who perceives the law
in its constantly changing social setting. The study of modem legis-
lation persuades one that any judicial interpretation that enables a
father to pauperize his helpless minor dependents is not only contrary
to considerations of humanity and subversive of the social interest,
but is hopelessly inconsistent with the clear policy of the law as
declared in statutory enactments. Obviously, it is the duty of the
Legislature to nullify such ill-advised judicial construction.
* 
24
'Table, Annual Expenditure for Mothers' Aid (Children's Bureau, Dept. of
Labor). It is estimated that in one year $5,830,805 were spent, exclusive of the
expense of administration, in Albany, Buffalo, New York, Rochester, Syracuse
Utica and Yonkers in the relief of poverty under Mothers' Pensions.
